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Abstract
In this commentary, I endeavor to respond to what I identify as the core question of Ruddick’s paper: How
does the theoretical dethroning of humanity force us to reinvent ethics? I expand on Spinoza’s profound
contribution to the radical rethinking of the subject at the level of ontology. Although Ruddick invokes
Spinoza, first and foremost, as a potential resource for ethics in light of climate disruption, I conclude that
those resources offer only a glimmer of how to live differently. The work of reimagination at the level of
metaphysics is flourishing, but we have yet to develop its implications for ethics and politics.
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So what if humans are not metaphysically excep-
tional, uniquely minded, or exclusive bearers of
value? So what if bodies do not end at the skin and
minds are not internal to individual human subjects?
So what if ecological systems exhibit a kind of savoir
faire, a clever power to recompose themselves and
persevere in creative response to radical changes?
What do these revolutionary perspectives in ontol-
ogy, metaphysics, and epistemology imply as we
confront myriad threats of ecological devastation?
What does the insistence on the illegitimacy of
human metaphysical privilege entail when human
and nonhuman interests come into conflict? And how
on earth can a 17th-century rationalist like Benedict
de Spinoza help us to approach these questions?
Susan Ruddick undertakes the ambitious effort to
stage an encounter between neovitalism and envi-
ronmental ethics. She urges those advocating a live-
lier apprehension of matter, organic, and inorganic
networks of power to consider the elephant (crack-
up) in the room. Once we see how profoundly con-
nected we are at the level of ontology and need,
what do we do? How do we reckon with the effects
of centuries of imperialism on the part of some
humans? How does the theoretical dethroning of
humanity as a category force us to reinvent ethics?
While Ruddick (2017), in her paper ‘Rethinking
the subject, reimagining worlds’, does not presume
to answer these questions, she constructs a web of
diverse thinkers, not usually in conversation with
one another, to form ‘a compass’ for the 21st cen-
tury. Honored to be woven into this web, I never-
theless confess my humility before the articulation
of a (if not the) fundamental challenge of our age.
Corresponding author:
Hasana Sharp, Associate Professor of Philosophy, McGill
University, 855 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal (QC) H3A 2T7,
Canada.
Email: hasana.sharp@mcgill.ca
Dialogues in Human Geography
2017, Vol. 7(2) 156–160
ª The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2043820617720063
journals.sagepub.com/home/dhg
Since I am a specialist of Spinoza’s philosophy, I
will confine myself to the task here of elaborating on
his profound challenge to any concept of ‘the sub-
ject’ with particular attention to its implications for
an anti-anthropocentric ethics. I will conclude with
a consideration of the problem of antagonism
among humans and nonhumans, which has become
increasingly acute in light of climate disruption.
Many revolutionary perspectives in ontology and
metaphysics cite Spinoza as inspiration. Indeed, his
philosophy offers a treasure trove of resources for an
expanded and anti-anthropocentric understanding of
the individual, mind, striving, interest, among other
major concepts. In order to address the problem of
ethical conflict, however, wemust, as Ruddick does,
think with rather than merely about Spinoza (cf.
Macherey, 1992). With Spinoza, we might still hope
for a better compass, but given the unprecedented
character of what the future promises, the work of
reimagining ethics has only just begun.
Ruddick finds in Spinoza’s ethics at least three
promising features: (i) human individuals are ‘com-
posite’, meaning that they are multiple and com-
plex, necessarily constituted by many diverse
powers, many (even most!) of which we would call
‘nonhuman’; (ii) ‘subjects’ (‘things’ or ‘finite
modes’, in Spinoza’s language) strive in such a way
that they must expand, overflow, and connect to
others; and (iii) it is possible to evaluate whether
and how certain compositions are enabling or dis-
abling, good or bad. Spinoza’s ethics thus acknowl-
edges and affirms the tremendous diversity of life,
the extent to which nonhuman reality constitutes
human existence, but without surrendering the pos-
sibility of normative evaluation. Even if what is
good for each singular being is unique to that thing,
it is objectively the case that some relations or
beings really are good or bad, helpful or harmful.
Moreover, the ethical reasoning sensitive to singu-
larities that Spinoza undertakes is not confined to
the unique needs of diverse human individuals, but
also to what enhances the being of a couple, a com-
monwealth, a people, a crowd, and so on. Etienne
Balibar declares that Spinoza’s originality lies in his
treatment of ‘them ass’ as his ‘principal object of
investigation, reflection, and historical analysis’
(1989: 106). Nevertheless, Spinoza gives negligible
attention to nonhuman powers, to how forms of
human association are always necessarily com-
prised of nonhuman elements. Ruddick pushes Spi-
noza beyond Spinoza in pursuit of a posthumanist
ethics that affirms both the value of biodiversity and
the reality of radical antagonism. It will be my effort
in what follows, as a Spinoza scholar, to clarify still
further what Spinoza offers her laudable project.
Ruddick (and others) are absolutely correct to
find in Spinoza’s philosophy a profound challenge
to our inherited conceptions of human subjectivity.
Best known, of course, is Spinoza’s rejection of
dualism, according to which mind (thought) and
body (extension) are fundamentally different things,
obeying two distinct sets of laws, and differently
valued (see Plumwood, 1993: Ch. 2). From the point
of view of Cartesian dualism, extended matter con-
forms predictably and necessarily to a rigid order of
cause and effect. Bodies are not self-organizing;
they are governed by inertia and derive their power
from outside them. Mind, in contrast, is infinite,
unconstrained by the rules of efficient causality, and
internally determined. Because mind is, in some
respect (i.e. the faculty of the will), infinite and
independent, it is of greater value than the finite and
dependent body. Dualism, then, maintains a
mutually exclusive binary, such that one member
is of greater metaphysical and moral value. This is
the well-known metaphysical underpinning of
human exceptionalism. As Rene´ Descartes notes,
animated by egalitarian impulses, things are minded
or they are not (Descartes, 1988: 20). All humans are
minded, and thus we are all equal to each other. Yet,
among created beings, mind is an exclusive (and
thus defining, essential) property of human beings,
which makes us superior to all other earthlings.
The exclusiveness and absolute difference of
mind from matter undergirds the dominant current
of humanism in western thought. It is a metaphysi-
cal thesis with the moral implication that humans
alone are moral ends and merit distinctive moral
consideration. As Immanuel Kant puts it:
Through reason, man conceived himself (though only
darkly) to be the true end of nature, and in this regard
nothing living on earth can compete with him. The first
time he said to the sheep, ‘the pelt that you bear was
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given to you by nature not for yourself, but for me’; the
first time he took that pelt and put it on himself (Gen
3:21) . . . he saw within himself the privilege by virtue
of which his nature surpassed that of all animals,
which he no longer regarded as fellows in creation,
but as subject to his will as means and tools for achiev-
ing his own chosen objectives. (Kant, 1970: 225)
Nonhumans can be instruments, ends to the
means of others, but humans demand a totally dis-
tinct moral orientation. Humans, and humans alone,
deserve to be respected as absolute values, ends in
themselves.
As both Gilles Deleuze (1994) and Antonio Negri
(1991)haveperhapsdone themost to show,Spinoza’s
philosophy yields rich possibilities for a flatter meta-
physical topology. Among Spinoza’s core metaphy-
sical doctrines is his view that thought and extension
are both infinite powers of nature, and everything
expresses as much intellectual power as it does cor-
poreal power (Spinoza, 2002: 247, E IIp7). A mind is
as free or servile, as powerful or weak, as self-
determiningorother-dependent, as its body (seeMon-
tag, 1999: Ch. 2). Spinoza’s theory of mind, more-
over, extends to all beings, even those most would
consider to be inanimate. ‘For what we have so far
demonstrated [concerning the nature and origin of the
mind] is of quite general application, and applies to
men no more than to other individual things, which
are all animate, albeit to different degrees’ (Spinoza,
2002: 251, E IIp13s). The universality of ‘animation’
or mindedness is such a comprehensive principle that
Spinoza analogizes the subjectivity of stones, circles,
and triangles to that of human beings. It is not only the
case that mountain gorillas, ant colonies, or forests
think.All finite things persist in thought and extension
to the same extent and, he suggests, with a similar
orientation toward the world. In a strange kind of
thought experiment, Spinoza insists that, if geometric
figures or rocks could convey to us their self-
experience, they would tell us both that they are free
and thatwhat is best iswhatevermost resembles them.
Spinoza urges an interlocutor, Hugo Boxel, to imag-
ine a stone or a triangle structured by a similar moral
psychology to our own: my kind is free, exceptional,
superior, and of superlative value. Spinoza observes
that a stone thrust through the air is ignorant of those
causes that allowed it to so fly. But its point of view is
such that, just like us, it would believe that its flight
was brought about by its own endeavor, and that its
motion was a consequence of its self-originating
desire. ‘This, then, is that freedom which all men
boast of possessing’, Spinoza insists. Our understand-
ing of ourselves as uniquely self-determined is noth-
ing but the perspectival and limited character of
knowledge: we typically know only the proximate
causes of our desires. Yet, our freedom to execute
an action is not different in kind from the freedom
ofa stone catapulted through the air. In the same letter,
Spinoza surmises that:
a triangle, if it could speak, would likewise say that
God is eminently triangular, and a circle that God’s
nature is eminently circular. In this way, each would
ascribe to God its own attributes, assuming itself to be
like God and all else to be ill-formed. (Spinoza, 2002:
908–910)
Thus, Spinoza suggests that not only do all things
exist in thought as much as they do in extension,
they all attribute to themselves a unique kind of
freedom and value that distinguishes them from all
other beings. By comparing humans not to ‘higher’
animals but to stones and triangles, Spinoza radi-
cally reconfigures human metaphysical priority.
Spinoza frequently urges his reader to grasp
humanity through the prism of geometry, considering
‘human actions and appetites just as if it were an
investigation into lines, planes, or bodies’ (Spinoza,
2002: 278, E IIIpref). However literally one takes his
analogies, it is undeniable that, at the level of meta-
physics, Spinoza profoundly disrupts the foundations
of humanism, according to which humans are
uniquely minded, at least partially exempt from the
general laws of nature, and thereby superior. As Rud-
dick emphasizes, he also disrupts individualist con-
ceptions of ‘thinghood’ by presenting human modes
as, like all modes, ineluctably bound to others, not
only dependent on them in order to exist and act but
also only ever provisionally distinct from them. As
composite individuals operating within a vast causal
network, wemust integrate others and exchange parts
of ourselves in order to continue to exist. Our being
constantly overflows our ostensible bodies, just as
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our bodies are comprised of more bacterial cells than
human ones (Wenner, 2007). With bounded indivi-
duality and human exceptionalism off the table, how
do we negotiate the conflicts that anthropogenic eco-
logical devastation render increasingly acute?
Revolutionary perspectives in metaphysics and
ontology refuse both the dualism, according to
which mind is other than and superior to body, and
human exceptionalism, according to which humans
are the only free and minded beings. With the nega-
tion of these two doctrines, we have an insurrection
against the kingdom of ends. Ruddick proposes that
the disruption of metaphysical privilege demands
new scales of justice, but it is not clear that the
revolutionary perspectives in ontology, metaphy-
sics, and epistemology are up to the task. Those who
have long worked on bringing justice to a consider-
ation of nonhuman nature, however, typically move
the walls surrounding the human kingdom but leave
the fortress intact (e.g. Regan, 2004). In my view,
we have a situation in which the more radical phi-
losophical outlook all but ignores practical consid-
erations, but the practical approach is overly modest
with respect to the metaphysical topography. Influ-
enced by Deleuze, the radical ontologists under-
standably avoid moral judgments, but it is worth
remembering that Deleuze admired Spinoza above
all for his practical philosophy (Deleuze, 1988).
Although Spinoza is frequently cited as inspira-
tion for radical perspectives in ontology, he is gen-
erally not viewed as a friend to environmental ethics
(Houle, 1997; Lloyd, 1980). Spinoza interrupts the
foundations of human exceptionalism and species
superiority, but he does not advocate balancing
human interests with nonhuman beings (Spinoza,
2002: 338, E IVp35s). Just as a triangle would
necessarily prefer all things insofar as they are tri-
angular, humans are determined to prefer and value
what they deem (correctly or not) to be most human.
It belongs to the essence of each and every being to
strive to persevere with as much vitality and perfec-
tion as is available to it (Spinoza, 2002: 283, E
IIIp6). Spinoza takes self-preference and self-
preservation to be both desirable and virtuous (Spi-
noza, 2002: 330–331, E IVp18s).
Nevertheless, he acknowledges that all finite
beings are profoundly vulnerable, persisting within
a force field of powers and counterpowers. There are
always other beings in nature by which one can be
destroyed (Spinoza, 2002: 323, E Ivax1). Even if his
ontology is flatter than traditional ones, his practical
philosophy is not at all flat. Simply put, and pace the
deep ecological interpretation (Sessions, 1977), no
ethical prescriptions follow from the fact that every-
thing is natural, minded, and conative. We can all
help or hurt one another by virtue of existing within
the same system of causal relationships. But our vul-
nerability to hostile forces does yield a prescriptive
ethics of mutually enabling composition. To live, we
need to combine with those other beings and forces
that amplify and support our existence. Spinoza
regarded other humans as unquestionably the most
important allies in our effort to maximize our mental
and corporeal powers (Spinoza, 2001: 331, E
IVp18s). But he also regarded humans as the most
dangerous others in nature (Spinoza, 2002: 686). Spe-
cies membership is not what makes an alliance, or a
super composition, enabling. It is a question only of
the extent to which another can increase the power of
the mind to produce ideas and the body to undergo
and generate affects (Spinoza, 2002: 341, E IVp38).
The assessment of which encounters enrich and con-
tribute to one’s existence and which do not is the
sensitive contextual work of practical reason (reason
illuminated by imagination). The art of formingmore
enabling compositions within a causal network is
very difficult, since it involves discerning the unanti-
cipatable effects of encounters among singular
beings with distinctive needs and variable affective
complexions. Spinoza paid little attention to the non-
human powers that necessarily sustain and amplify a
human’s life, let alone the adverse effects human
actions have on those nonhuman powers. I have
argued that his system encourages an appreciation
of those myriad and varied forces (Sharp, 2011b).
An appreciation, however, does not provide a means
of adjudicating conflicts.
It strikes me that Spinoza contributes a great deal
to what I’ve called revolutionary perspectives in
ontology, metaphysics, and epistemology. More-
over, as Ruddick suggests, the sensitivity of his phi-
losophy not only to connection and continuity but
also to antagonism and vulnerability provides a use-
ful corrective to those ontologies that dethrone the
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human without sufficient consideration of the dis-
tinct forms of violence that characterize human life.
Yet, I fear we remain with only the faintest of guide-
lines in terms of how to evaluate the conflicts pro-
voked by anthropogenic ecological devastation.
Certainly, human vitality and perseverance in the
21st century requires a much keener appreciation
of the biotic and atmospheric systems that sustain
us than Spinoza ever could have imagined. Spinoza
warned us not to communicate or ally with beasts,
unable to recognize how such interspecies commu-
nity could be enriching or vitalizing. He hoped to
preempt interspecies conflict by denouncing inter-
species community of any kind (see Sharp, 2011a).
Yet, it is clear that human vitality, especially on the
mass collective level that Spinoza identifies as ‘rea-
son’s’ greatest hope (Spinoza, 2002: 331, E IVp18),
requires an increasingly expansive understanding of
interdependence, cooperation, and struggle.
Although humanity’s special place in the universe
has been challenged on many fronts, our revision of
ethics has only just begun. With Ruddick, I agree
that, in the face of 21st-century climate disruption,
we cannot live without an ecological ethics. In this
endeavor, Spinoza is our friend, a good friend even,
but ours is a rather long-distance relationship.
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